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ABSTRACT 
The present foreign ex change crisis in Kenya could 
occasion a boom in our foundries and metal engineering work-
shops if the government adopts policies to vigorously en-
courage - instead of hampering - these key industries. Their 
plant and equipment, skilled workers, and supervisors are 
massively underuti1izea principally due to a lack of planned 
development for these industries. But now given that existing 
capacity, a boom in the foundries and metal engineering indust-
ries could be created by: drastically limiting the number of 
models of cars, trucks and various products, eliminating imports 
of domestically producible items, selectively improving the 
capacities and quality controls in thes~ industries, lowering 
the inflated prices that wholesalers charge for specialty steels, 
reducing the over-reliance upon and cost of licensing agreements, 
restricting parent protection, and discriminatorily favouring 
the allocation of foreign exchange to foundries and the engineer-
ing industries. Also the government's huge railway workshops 
should be put to work to make components for many products 
(i.e. pumps). The implementation of these policies would 
create thousands of jobs through backward and forward linkages 
(e.g. for plastic components; assembly of the products, and 
from usage in agriculture) and would decrease import dependence. 
But the adoption of these policies to increase domestic production 
in these industries would encounter strong opposition from importers 
and multi-national assemblers of imported components. 
These conclusions were drawn from visits to 91 metal 
engineering workshops and 19 foundries in Nairobi, Kisumu, 
Thika, Magadi, Mombasa and elsewhere. 
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"CONVERTING CRISIS TO BOOM FOR KENYAN FOUNDRIES AND METAL 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES: TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES VERSUS POLITICAL 
AND BUREAUCRATIC OBS1ACLES" 
By 
Peter E. Coughlin* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present foreign exchange crisis in Kenya could 
occasion a boom in our foundries and metal engineering workshops 
if the government adopts policies to vigorously encourage - instead 
of nampering - these key industries. Their plant and equipment, 
skilled workers, and supervisors are massively underutilized 
principally due to a lack of planned development for these indus-
tries. But now given the existing capacity, these industries 
could produce very many products that are currently imported. To 
achieve this, strong new policies are needed concerning the 
unavailability and high cost of inputs, foreign exchange allocations, 
quality controls, selective improvements in capacities, the 
gross underutilization of the government's huge railway work-
shops, the rationalization of product lines, patent protection, 
and the over-reliance on foreign licensing agreements . But the 
adoption and implementation of these policies to increase domestic 
production in these industries would encounter strong opposition 
from importers and multinational assemblers of imported components. 
These conclusions were drawn from visits to 91 metal engineer-
engineering workshops and 19 foundries in Nairobi, Kisumu, 
Thika, Magadi, Mombasa -and elsewhere between August 19 81 - and 
'-'The author is a lecturer in Economics at the University of 
Nairobi, Kenya. The author expresses gratitude to the Dean's 
Committee of the University's Faculty of Arts which partially 
financed this research. The author also thanks Stanley Ikiao, for 
nis thorough and competent assistance. Kirimi Ikiara, Mohammed 
Mukras, Yusuf Nxibo, T.C.I. Ryar., and Kamal Siddiqui also rendered 
-.any useful comments and criticisms of the preliminary drafts. 
Rnoda Kathuni, Grace Kamenyi , Harriet Kabugi and Penina Rapasi 
.so should be commended for their patience and diligence in 
typing the drafts. 
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January 1933 (the bulk between December, 1981, and July, 1982 ). 
Nearly all the large and most of the small workshops in these 
cities were visited. The author and his assistant visited both 
commercial metal engineering workshops (66) and those attached 
to factories (22) or to the Railways (3). Multinational corpora-
tions owned five of the commercial metal engineering workshops with 
one in Nairobi and four in Mombasa, Africans owned only one 
commercial workshop; Kenyan residents or citizens of Asian ancestry 
owned the rest. One foundry was at the Railway's Nairobi workshop 
and four others were attached to factories, the rest were commercial. 
The author visited the railways' workshops on ten occasions often 
spending a whole or half day making detailed observations and 
enquiries. When visiting repair workshops attached to factories, 
the author first toured the entire factory and then often examined 
the spares in the storeroom to determine whether some items could 
be made in Kenya. Afterwards plant managers and/cr workshops 
supervisors wore interviewed, an inventory of the metal engineering 
machinery was taken, and work samples were observed. The study 
focused on metal engineering excluding metal fabrication (e.g. 
bending and welding). 
2. MASS1V1J UNDERUTILIZATION OF MEM AND MACHINES. 
2.1. The present situation. 
With the presently underutilized machinery, workers, 
supervisors and space, these industries could greatly expand 
output with only minimal additional investment. The foundries 
use only 2 3% of their capacity and metal engineering workshops use 
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only 34% (see appendix tables 1A and IB)."" Output could be expanded 
by 42% in machine shops and 106% in foundries just by more inten-
sively using the existing labor force without any ad di t i on a1 ho urs ! 
In tne short-term, of course, more overtime could be used too. In 
tne medium-term, machine shops could c xpand their workforce by a 
weighted average of 62% without needing more supervisors (see Appendix 
table 2). Virtually all respondents also claimed that if needed they 
could promote foremen from among present employees. The workforce 
could also increase rapidly because even with only cn-the-job 
training new foundry workers can become semi-skilled in less than 
12 months and machine shop workers in less than 7\ years especially 
if they are keen (see Appendix 3A and chart 3B.) Present workers can 
be upgraded in as much time. Hence these industries can meet their 
needs for most supervisors ana artisans in both the short and medium?™' 
Space is also underutilized in many machine shops though this 
varied: on the average shops in Nairobi could expand their equipment 
by 2 8% in the same space, those in Mombasa by 3% and in Kisumu by 84% 
(see Appendix table 2). All except the two big well equiped foundries 
at the Railways workshop and at the E.A. Foundries are cramped for 
space. But it is exactly in these two big well equipped foundries 
that any expansion would best occur1. 
1. The weighted average capacity utilization (U9) equals: 
f i 3 
V ~ 3 ~ ; ? Z (L?xH?)/(l+A. ) I 
! S 2 <L?) I X , i=i S = 1 1 1 " \ i 1 
? i=l s=l j ; 120 I 
g •. y 
Where L^ = Labourers in the machine shop at plant i during 
shift s. c 
rb = average hours worked per week at plant i 
during shift s. 
A^ = percentage of additional work that could be done 
at plant i without any additional employees, work 
hours, or plant and equipment. This is a measure of 
slack during the current shifts. 
eventy-seven per cent of respondents indicated a willingness to run 
second shift if work were to permanently increase and 44% thought 
that productivity on the second shift would be at least as good as 
on the first shift. Hence, two shifts of 60 hours per week (120, hours) 
were deemed a reasonable maximum for small workshops. Though large 
rkshops could possibly run continuously, the same measure for 
pacity utilization was used for all. 
/ 
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2.2. The Causes of Excess Capacity 
The perceptions of why so much excess capacity exists 
differ from the viewpoints of a single shop and of the entire 
sector. From the shop, the principal causes appear as a lack of 
demand (26%) and the failure by many machine shops attached to 
factories to accept outside orders (29%) (See Appendix Table 4; 
2 
multiple answers were allowed) '. This failure is sometimes not 
necessary. For instance, foremen of some very nicely equipped 
workshops attached to factories argued that given more men they 
could cope with outside work especially if it were to make products 
rather than^o miscellaneous repair jobs.0 The shortages of 
inputs (35%) and of trained technicians (36%) also hindered 
expansion though these difficulties were often seen as surmountable 
by the interviewees , whereas the lack of demand was not. 
From a sectoral viewpoint the underutilization of capacity 
appears to result principally from the lack of planning of both 
investments and demand though the shortage of proper materials 
and border difficulties with Tanzania and Uganda also affect 
the industry. On the supply side, an anarchistic series of small 
investments and the uncontrolled importation of machinery caused 
the over capitalization of these industries while still leaving 
important deficiencies (e. .. in high precision and stainless 
steel casting, and in tool and die making). This over capitali-
zation is manifested by the near-ly universal use of only one 
4 . . . . shift. On the demand side, the failure to insist on the .local 
manufacture of many spare parts and diverse consumer products 
(e.g. umbrellas, electric irons, cutlery) and to control strictly 
eagerly 
2. Five workshops attached to major enterprises quite/accepted 
outside work and a few other such workshops would occasionally 
accept outside work if the customer had no alternative repair shop 
to go to . 
3. One excellent workshop attached to a factory in Mombasa 
had extensive gear making equipment but did not seek outside orders 
even though the factory had been closed for six months. 
4. Some small entrepreneurs prefer having one shift. This 
reduces their managerial difficulties and lininates any risk frc 
allowing significant control to leave family hands. But still, 
three quarters of the respondents were willing to start a second 
shift if a prolonged increase in demand occurred. Furthermore, 
almost half the respondents anticipated that labour productivity 
on a second shift would be equal to or better (e.g. less inter-
ruptions) than that for the first shift. (see Appendix table 
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their importation has limited domestic growth. Only the recent 
foreign exchange crisis and the reversal of the policy allowing 
easy importation of any spares for factories has forced some 
to seriously review what can be made in their own workshops.0 
And though the capacity exists to make certain products, the anti-
cipated inability to get governmental cooperation and protection 
against well positioned importers dissuades some potential 
producers from pursuing these possibilities or make: them to be satisfied 
with small market shares e.g. pumps, ox driven sugar cane crushers 
(see the section on political/economic and bureaucratic obstacles). 
Another reason for the underutilization of capacity parti-
cularly in the Kisumu area is the decrease in demand due to 
border difficulties with Tanzania and internal strife in Uganda. 
3. WHAT PREVENTS A SURGE IN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION? 
Though output could expand rapidly in these industries, 
supply, demand, and political/economic reasons are preventing it. 
These obstacles will be examined below together with policy, re-
commendations . 
3.1. Supply Problems 
3.1.1. High cost and unavailability of materials and tools. 
a). Situation 
Seventy one percent (71%) of the respondents vigorously 
complained .about the near imposibility or expensiveness of 
5. A huge factory in Nairobi recently assigned a man full-time 
to assess the possibilities for and to arrange the local manufacture 
of spares. But even yet, most of the factories visited are not 
this serious and based on visits to their stock rooms and inquiries 
about the origins of specific spares s it is clear that very many 
spares that could be made here are still imported. For example, 
the repair workshop foreman in a large factory in Mombasa stated 
that, if management wanted the engineering machine shop could even 
begin a second shift to produce for inventory many currently 
imported spares. He said that on net, after purchasing materials, 
foreign exchange would be saved though the total costs including 
ror local labour on some of these spares might be higher than for 
xho imports. Indeed only recently have many factories begun to 
their- repair workshops to make spares for stock in anticipation 
of needs. 
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obtaining essential materials (e.g. gear quality steels, heat 
resistant steels, stainless steels, other speciality steels, 
special grinding stones, coke, certain chemicals). For instance, 
the machine shop foreman of one large factory stated, "If we 
could get these quality steels we could produce many more items 
which are now imported". Elsewhere another foreman stated that 
given proper steels he could make 15-20% of the spares currently 
imported by his very large company. 
Due to the unavailability of correct materials, unsuitable 
ones are often substituted but they break of wear quickly. This 
increases costs and reinforces preferences for imported spares. 
For instance, Magadi Soda obtained a large gear made of mild 
steel for one of its cranes .3 that ?ear lasted three hours. Later 
an imported gear was flown in. 
When available, specialty steels usually have extremely 
high prices. The local importers/wholesalers add 100--1+00% to 
the c.i.x. Mombasa port price. And yet when small commercial 
machine shops want to import these steels at much lower prices 
they usually can not get a license though some multinational corpo-
rate subsidiaries can order through their international supplies 
departments. These high wholesale margins increase the cost of 
domestically made spares and also lead to a preference for imported 
spares. 
The delays (3-12 months) and frequent rejections of license 
applications often force the importation of spares that could be 
made here if the proper materials were available (e.g. gears for 
cranes and automobile transmissions). Besides, companies often 
obviate the delays and unpredictability of the government's import 
licensing by overstocking materials by a weighted average of 57%. g 
(see Appendix 7) . Or, instead of overstocking, some firms 
6. For instance, one foundry owner claimed he stocks 18 months 
supply of coke but he could stock just 6 months supply if 
licensing were reliable. A large machine shop owner figured 
he could cut his stocks of materials by 70% if licensing were 
more predictable. 
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brine, in packages valuin_ less than 4000 KSns by air freight. 
Tnis increases transport costs by perhaps half. By either tactic 
foreign exchange costs are increased. 
The structure of import duties often creates negative 
protection for these industries. The most usual duty on imported 
spares is 33% and then 15% sales tax if the item is not exempt 
from sales tax (e.g. spares for agricultural or dairy equipment). 
Specialty steels attract a higher duty (tool steels 44%, stainless 
steel rounds and flats 55%) ana then on top, the Sales tax. Or, 
worse yet, many classes of spares arc exempted from sales taxes 
while the materials needed to make the spares are not exempted if 
imported by a commercial machine shop or wholesaler/importer 
instead of the exempted firm. Two examples illustrate these 
problems. 
(1) Current tariffs discriminate against reconditioning 
the stainless steel heat exchangers used by many 
industries. New imported heat exchangers pay 33% duty and 
then, on top, sales tax, whereas the seamless stainless 
steel tubes needed for reconditioning pay 77% duty and 
then sales tax. 
(2) Brooke Bond can recondition its tea rollers either with 
finished imported segments or by redressing them 
using stainless steel automatic welding wire. 
It now appears to be about KShs. 2,500 cheaper per 
roller to import finished segments than refurbishing them 
only because the automatic welding wire pays KSh. 6 ,000 more 
in duty and sales tax than the imported segments. However, 
Brooke Bond still is preferring the later, costlier 
alternative. 
If Brooke Bond reverted to the previous practice, of importing 
segments, it would be cheaper for Brooke Bond, but Kenya 
would pay about KSh. 4 ,000 more per roller .in foreign ex-
change. Since about 75 rollers are reconditioned yearly 
the loss in foreign exchange would be about KSh. 300,000 
(see Appendix table 8). 
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Allegedly corruption among import licensing officials, 
the Mombasa post's and Nairobi Airport's customs officers and 
Central Bank employees, who deal with foreign exchange allocations, 
also causes delays and increased costs which hinder Kenyan indus-
trialization. Complaints about the need to bribe officials dealing 
with imports were so frequent that tne practice must be widespread. 
As the purchases manager for a large commercial metal engineering 
workshop stated, ,!you can't get things out unless you give a 
backhand. It happens everyday". For instance, one factory flew 
in a desperately needed spare part but could not get it released 
from the airport until a top official of the company made a trip 
to Nairobi and bribed the customs authorities. 
b). Re commen dati ons 
(1). Foundries and metal engineering 'workshops are pivotal to 
the smooth running of all Kenyan Industries. Foundries and 
metal engineering workshops are qualitatively different than 
most other industries in that their products are used almost entirely 
by other industries. Any additional production would mostly be 
to replace imports. Thus, if foundries and metal engineering 
workshops were allowed to import their materials easily, they could 
make domestically many spares that are currently imported. Fur-
thermore, the materials needed by these industries are so elemental 
that they could not be diverted for improper usage. Hence the 
government should issue permanent import licenses for the elemental 
materials used by machine shops and foundries (some metals e.g. 
pig iron, 7.inc, tools e.g. certain grinding stones, cutting tips; 
chemicals e.g. ferrosilicon, resins for molds; coke). After 
mere verification of their documents requesting funds to import 
any of these materials, the companies in these industries should 
7. An elemental rule of business management states that any 
bureaucratic procedure, whi ch-re garale s s of circumstances — 
always produces the same decision, can be eliminated. Applications 
for import licenses for elemental materials are almost always 
approved eventually. And the delays are costly. Hence, should 
the bureaucrats handling such applications be given other duties? 
be permitted to go directly to the Central 3ank for an allocation 
of foreign exchange. Thus the government should be liberal in 
allocating foreign exchange to these industries. This policy 
of preferential allocation of foreign exchange to foundries and 
metal engineering workshops would, on net, save foreign exchange 
by encouraging the domestic manufacture of currently imported spares 
and industrial equipment. This would loosen - not tighten - the 
foreign exchange constraints on other industries. 
Moreover this policy would fit within a general policy to 
stimulate deeper industrialization by preferentially allocating 
foreign exchange to those basic industries such as cement which 
nave strong backward and/cr forward linkages. Under such a 
policy the government should: (1) squeeze selected consumer oriented 
industries that rely heavily upon imported inputs; and (2) further 
limit imports of consumer goods. However, since the recommended 
policy for the foundry and metal engineering industries would 
save foreign exchange it is also justifiable on that ground 
alone and without reference to a broader policy of sectoral 
priorities for foreign exchange allocations. 
2. The government should encourage and through selective credit 
priorities help the foundries and machine shops to obtain finance 
to establish an import cooperative. It should be controlled by 
the plants in the industries to guarantee a keen concern for 
speed and efficiency and to prevent arbitrary changes .in materials 
specifications. The cooperative would import centrally 
the industries' principal materials and more common spares. It 
need not import the entire range of materials and spares . it 
should focus its finances and efforts to achieve large savings in 
foreign exchange. This cooperative would enable the industry to: 
8 
(i) obtain price and freight discounts for bulk purchases . 
(ii) reduce overall stock levels in the industry by centralizing 
these wholesale stocks (iii) eliminate profit gouging by wholesalers 
who happen to possess a material in short supply, and (iv) 
eliminate overinvoicing ot 
8. host coke comes from Germany because delivery times are more 
reliable tnougn it costs twice that of Indian coke. A centralized 
purchaser could order some coke from India and compensate for the 
unreliability of the delivery dates by shipment from Germany. This 
would decrease the average cost of coke. (dote: some use Indian 
coke without complaint, others complain both about the unrelia-
bixity of its delivery and its high sulphur content. Before 
ordering from India the quality of that coke would need to be 
guaranteed.) 
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these materials by wholesalers ana by firms ordering directly 
from tneir mqtner companies1 purchasing departments; and (v) 
rapidly identify when the Kenyan demand for an item was sufficient 
to justify its production here. 
(3). Trie proposed import cooperative could also specialize in 
importing used gasoline and diesel motors for sale to trans-
porters and machine shops which renovate motors. This would 
create employment and save much foreign exchange since currently 
only new motors are allowed to be imported. 
(4). The combined tariffs and sales taxes for metals should be 
set lower than those for imported finished spares. This would 
encourage the local production of spares. 
(5). Tne government should initiate a major and ongoing probe 
of corruption by import licensing, customs and Central Bank 
employees and officers. 
3.1.2. Poor Quality control in Foundries and metal Engineering 
Worksnops 
a. Si tuation 
Only one foundry had facilities to test the composition 
of sample casts. One other foundry was installing laboratory 
equipment, hone had spectrometers to read tne content of carbon, 
sulphur and other elements in the hot melt and thus be able 
ii:unediately to add measured amounts of alloys to improve the 
quality of the metal. Hence casts are frequently too hard, 
9. For instance, the Kikuyu steel rolling mills has a huge and 
idle macnine that cost K. Shs. 1,500,000 and"could machine many of 
the brake drums used on cars and trucks in Kenya. But because 
of 
poor quality control of the drum castings and because of anti 
cipated resistance by the multinational corporations involved in 
vehicle assembly and spare parts supplies, all the brake drums 
in Kenya are imported. 
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brittle, or soft or have bubbles and so cannot be used. Unfor-
tunately, this is often discovered only after an attempt is made to 
macnine them. Many incustries cannot risk such costly delays 
and so prefer to import spares by air freight. 
b) Recommendations ; 
(1) This problem of inadequate quality controls in the 
foundries is urgent. It stimulates imports and retards the growth 
of metal engineering. Hence, the government should: (i) declare 
that investments to improve the laboratory equipment in foundries 
is a selective credit priority in order to make loans readily 
available for that purpose, and (ii) insist that the Bureau of 
Standards energetically scrutinize the quality control procedures 
used by foundries. 
(2) Last May or so the Railway's workshops which include the 
only Kenyan foundry with scientific quality control, began to refus 
to do most commercial jobs even though it has much excess capacity. 
This decision was taken to stop corruption and the preferential 
treatment given to commercial work to the detriment of jobs for 
railways. Through collusion, jobs were underpriced e.g. a forging 
die and thousands of mattocks might be ordered but billed mintinally 
or a large sugar roller made while payment was for a small one. 
But that decision to stop commercial work may also increase 
dependence upon imports.1'1 The workshops' manager does state 
that he refuses only jobs which can be done elsewhere in Kenya, 
out in practice that distinction may be difficult to apply. More-
over if corruption was the problem a frontal assault is needed 
rather than the bureaucratic ally easy solution of stopping 
commercial work. Also the Railways might consider eliminating the 
nuisance of low value - small volume repair jobs, but accept 
For example, the Railway workshop has occasionally cast 
cylinder linings for internal combustion engines. Instead of 
;oing fully into this and properly controlling quality to replace 
imported cylinder linings , now the workshops does not cast them. 
So the country is 100% import dependent for these. 
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bigger orders. Big jobs are easier to supervise and to guard 
against corruption. 
3.1.3. Need for selective investments to improve the scope of 
metal casting and engineering. 
a. Situation 
Kenyan foundries have only a limited capacity for high 
precision casting. They have resin and sand and shell-mould 
casting and some iron moulds for mass production of non-ferrous 
castings.1"1' There is only one hot metal. in jection mold machine 
in the country and no foundry does investment and centrifugal 
casting. Tne Railway's workshop will soon receive a small, 
1.2 tonne, induction furnace able to make stainless and other 
steels if the proper laboratory equipment is obtained. 
The metal engineering industry needs to considerably 
strengthen its capacity to make sophisticated tools for industrial 
use. For ins tance,heat treatment equipment is often inadequate 
and/or improperly controlled and monitored. This detracts from 
tne industry's ability to make items such as gears which must 
sustain strong stresses. Also the industry needs to upgrade its 
capacity to make dies, especially for the plastics rubber, and 
&lass industries. Many tools and dies are now imported. 
11. The Ministry of Industry is collaborating with a Yugoslav 
consulting firm, Gostol, to assess the economics of establishing 
a hign precision foundry in Kenya. In various conversations I 
have suggested that perhaps expanding and improving the E.A. 
Foundry or the Railway's Foundry would be a quicker and cheaper 
alternative to implement than a separate new plant. Though it 
is anticipated that improvement via expansion is likely to be 
technically possible some view it skeptically due to what they 
perceive as negative attitudes by management and the unlikelihood 
that the government would exert strong influences to remedy 
those perceived administrative efficiencies. But the trade-off 
might be between. (1) using domestic resources to rectify whatevo 
administrative deficiencies exist, ana, (2) using more and very 
scarce foreign exchange to sidestep those problems. This preju 
in favour of separate new facilities and against using and impr 
ving existing capacity should be overcome. All options shoul: 
evaluated'. If Gostol does not, then the Ministry of Industry 
should evaluate this option too
IDS/WP NO. 39 8 
d). Re ccrome r. d a t i on s 
(1) To encourage the few existing Kenyan tool and die 
makers to increase their capabilities substantially, such invest-
ments should be designated a selective credit priority. The 
government should stringently control the importation of tools 
and dies and insist on their domestic manufacture whenever 
12 . . . possible. Also some experienced expatriate tool and die 
makers (who speak English or Kiswahili so that they can train 
Kenyans) should be allowed into the country to strengthen this 
capacity. In fact, there are immediate possibilities to export 
tools for aluminium spinning and to make locally many of the 
currently imported dies if more skilled tool and die makers; were 
available, 
(2) The Railways should be requested to assess quickly 
the economics of installing a very large forge in their work-
shops. The railways uses many large forged items (e.g. wagon 
axles, axle frames and 5000-6000 metal rail tyres per year) and 
there are other potential customers especially if the vehicle 
assembly industry were rationalized. 
3.1,4. Railways Workshop - A Bound Giant 
Th£uf(?ilways workshop is grossly underutilized and, for 
example produce most of the currently imported sugar crusher 
rollers. 
12. A manufacturer of rubber boots admitted that he refused 
to use a locally made aluminium die because of very small and 
technically insignificant differences in the ripples around the 
neel when compared to the original worn out die. He said the 
consumers want to continue to receive identical products. So 
ne ordered an imported die. 
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Situation - Underutilized Capacity. 
The railways' workshop with some 2600 employees is the 
largest workshop in the country, yet its facilities are grossly 
underutilized. It has about 9% of the centre lathes in the 
country and 6 8% of the turret lathes which are designed speci-
fically for mass producing items. The tool and machine rooms 
have 233 employees, run one-shift and have a capacity utilization 
rate of 2 8%. According to the workshops' manager, the tool and 
machine shops could produce two-thirds more with the same men, 
3ame Hours, and same machines if they had additional jobs to do 
and had better supervision and production planning. For instance, 
he agreed that the Railways could machine 4000 centrifugal water 
pumps (all currently imported) for near zero marginal costs. 
The foundry has 12 7 employees and a capacity utilization 
rate of 25%. The blacksmiths workshop has 60 employees and. 
A.K. Mitra of UNID0/ estimated that it uses a mere 5-10% of its 
13 large capacity. 
There is no technical reason why these shops could not run 
up to tnree shifts. Also the workshops' manager and his assistant 
both claimed that with proper production planning the workshops 
could make commercial products without interferring with service 
to the Railways. Unfortunately the Railways Act, by ommission, 
does not allow the workshops to engage in commercial production 
unless specifically directed to do so by the government. 
13. A.K. Mitra, "Report of the Field Mission in Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Mauritius for upgrading existing foundry, 
forging, heat treatment, machine shop, tool room and identifica-
tion of the manufacture of selected agricultural machinery, capital 
goods, and spare parts', U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, 
Joint ECA/UNID0 Division, Addis Ababa, July, 1980. 
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Recc.mmon.daticn: 
The government should immediately direct the Railways 
to identify needed products such as pumps and to begin commercial 
production. A directive could De quick and would avoid legal 
difficulties. Distribution, sales, spare parts supplies, and 
servicing should be set up as a separate organization or perhaps 
SUB-contracted temporarily to an existing distributor (e.g. of 
pumps). Once the Railways commits itself to making a particular 
item the government should monitor and limit permits to import 
competing items. By the time the Railways begins production, 
most of the stocks of competing items should have been sold. 
Afterwards their importation should be stopped.' 
Later, the government could widen the scope of the 
Railway's Act to explicitly allow the workshops to do commercial 
work. 
Situation . - Sugar crusher rollers. 
The Railways workshops' production of sugar crusher-
rollers deserves special mention. The workshops have the capacity 
i 
to cast and shape all but the largest sugar crusher-rollers, 
but a major complaint by Railway's customers for sugar rollers 
is slowness of delivery. However, millions of shillings are 14 spent on importec sugar crusher-rollers I . 
(1). Since these rollers have standard sizes, the Rail-
ways should carry a ready inventory of rough castings and 
machined rollers for quick delivery to c u s t o m e r s . T o assist 
14. For instance, the E.A. Sugar Factory imports nine out 
of the twelve or so sugar crusher-rollers it uses yearly. The 
c.i.f. Mombasa price was about KShs. 50,000.00 each before duties. 
15. The Railways' only boring machine which is large enough 
to handle these rollers appears to be the bottleneck for speedier 
delivery. It should be run two or three shifts when necessary 
especially since the alternative is to waste foreign exchange' 
on imported sugar rollers. The acting workshops' manager said 
that running the boring machine for multiple shifts could elimi-
nate that bottleneck. 
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the Railways, the sugar factories should be required to submit a 
yearly plan of their anticipated requirements. With these 
measures a ban should be placed on imported sugar rollers that 
can be made here. 
(2) As with many items produced by the Railways, sugar 
rollers are sold to intermediaries. These middlemen merely 
increase the price and re-sell the rollers to the sugar companies. 
The Railways should obtain the full profit by insisting on dealing 
directly with the sugar companies! In fact, the Railways1 dubious 
practice of selling many products through intermediaries should 
16 
be severely limited. 
3.2. Demand Problems 
3.2.1. Too many Makes and Models. 
a. Situation 
Too many makes and models of trucks, cars, tractors, pumps, 
stoves, and other machinery and equipment arts imported or 
assembled in Kenya. For example, India with perhaps 60 times 
Kenya's population produces only two makes of cars in three 
models, but Kenya actually assembles more than 90 models of 
trucks and buses and has at least 60 makes of 
sedan cars in about 200 models on the streets. Kenya also 
imports more than 260 models of water pumps and obtains tractors 17 
from at least 15 countries. The existence of so many models 
inhibits the local manufacture of components and spares, increases 
inventory costs and encumbers laoour training. 
16. Examples were cited to the author where government agencies 
(e.g. Post Office) would order thousands of machined castings 
through a middleman who would merely order tnese from the Rail-
ways and resell them to the government at a large profit. To 
stop this the Railways should be required to know the ultimate 
user of its products. Except for small amounts, if the user 
is the government itself, then the order should be placed by 
that governmental body, not by a middleman. 
17. G. Begumisa found that 33 firms sold 4,582 pumps in 116 mak<?« 
and 26 3 models during 19 80. "The worst redundant differentiati 
is concentrated around low capacity water pumps." This is exact 
the range of pumps that Kenya should and could begin quickly to 
make. This abundance of models is indisputably beyond mere 
nical requirements and could be decreased radically. Gregory 
Begumisa, Machine Goods Spareparts Industries. A case Study cf 
Water Pumps Industry in"" Kenya, University of Nairobi, Uripubl 
M.A. Research Paper, 19 82", pp. 6 3,64, and 101. 
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So few spares ana original equipment components are 
needed for the local repair or assembly of any particular model 
that the costs for their local production would be very high. 
!his is especially true if expensive metal stamping dies are 
required. Such short production • runs and high costs stymie 
the local manufacture of most spares and original equipment 
components. In fact, so long as the chaos of so many models 
is allowed, Kenya1 s foundries and metal engineering industries 
will be crippled. 
The stocks of spares parts are immense yet insufficient. 
A limitation in models would enable a more complete range of 
spares to be stocked ana thus lessen prolonged breakdowns of 
equipment due to an unavailability of spares. 
Even the training of mechanics and the maintenance of our 
vehicles, motors, and pumps are handicapped by the multitude 
of makes and models. As some countries have discovered, mechanics 
would learn better and quicker with, say, 2 models of cars, 
7-8 models of trucks and fewer models of motors and pumps. 
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The Kenyan foundries and metal engineering industries 
have the capacity to begin rapidly to make spare parts or 
even entire products if policies were initiated to limit 
seriously the number of makes and models. But without the 
government's cooperation and prohibitive tariffs against 
imports, corporations prefer not to hazard their money in 
such small and sliced-up markets. Consider the following 
examples where, if the models were limited and imports restricted, 
Kenya could produce for much of its own needs: 
(1) i Kenya could produce all its needs for small or 
medium sized single stage centrifugal water 
pumps at substantial savings of foreign exchange. 
G. Begumisa costed the production of 1500 pumps 
3 
(20 meter head and 50m /hr capacity) at less than 
half the cost including freight at Mombasa of 
imports'. And only 4.5% of the total cost would 
be for imported finished components (i.e. just 
13 the bearings ) . 
Chemelil Sugar Factory has also made a few large 
pumps cheaper than the imported ones even on a 
one-off basis. Probably half the 10,000 pumps 
that Kenya now imports yearly could be made here 
just by using a small portion of the foundries 
and metal engineering industries' current excess 
capaci ty. 
The Railway's workshop also occasionally makes large 
water mpumps for its own use. So, there is no question 
( 
that the necessary skills do exist in Kenya. Kenya 
spent KShs 21,000,000 on imported pumps for use in 
Kenya in 1980. 
13. G. Begumisa, Machine Goods and Spareparts Industries: 
A Case Study of the Water Pumps Industry in Kenya. University 
of Nairobi, M . A. Research Paper, Department of Economics, 1982. 
pp. 63, 64 and 101. 
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(2) Kenya could cast, rr^-hine, assemble, end 
I distribute its own small (less than 10 horsepower) 
• electrical motors. By using the prices which the 
Railways charges commercial customers for casting 
and machining and adding other costs including 
those for assembly and distribution by a separate 
corporation, Jcsphert Konzolo estimated that a 
Kenyan-made 3 horsepower a.c. electrical rr.otor 
could retail for KSh.s. 3:00.00 or about equal to 
average retail price for which imported motors are 
currently heir.;? sold here. But sine the Railways 
workshops are so underutilized, the casting and machining 
could be done; with the same men. same hours and 
same machinery as th< workshops now use. Thus the 
opportunity costs to the nation would be about 
K.Shs. 1915.00 which is less than the cheapest 3 
horsepower motor being sold here. The foreign 
exchange cost would be only XShs. 835.00 tvonzolo 
concludes that, "These motors can be manufactured 
in this country without the nerd for any form of 
reliance on multinational companies and at low 
19 
foreign exchange coots" Of course, a competent 
engineer would need to strictly supervise the 
assembly and quality control. 
(3) Kenya also has the proper equipment to manufacture 
gas and eicctric stoves and refrigerator boxe:>. 
Nevertheless, all the stoves except the srall table-top 
version and about half the refrigerators 
19. Josphert Konzolo, Machine Goods and Space Parts 
Indus tr~~.es: /• Case Study of the Flcctrica'l "iotor/Gpne rato.r 
Rewind' ng. Industry, Economics Department, University of 
Nairobi, Unpublished M.A. Research Pap<.-r, 1982, p. 64. 
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are imported as semi-or completely - knocked - down kits and 
subjected to "screw driver" assembly. Refrigerator boxes need 
metal cutting and bending, but stoves need metal stamping. 
The Railways' workshops have two usually idle 150-200 tonne 
sheet metal stamping presses (the large one can stamp 5 ft 
square sheets). The enameling for the stoves could be done 
in Kaluwork's very large continuous process oven. If 
organized this way, then any large sheets which Kaluworks 
is unable to stamp could be done by the Railways workshop and 
20 
then transported to Mombasa for enameling. Many companies 
have the capacity to make the small metal and plastic parts 
for stoves. 
(4) ! Virtually all the required plant and equipment now exists 
in Kenya to make the major parts for small, one and two 
cylinder compressors and diesel or gasoline internal combus-
tion engines. Kenya would only need to import the valves, 
bearings, and some small components plus the metal ingots 
for the castings. The E.A. Foundries has brand new conti-
nuous process sand selection and no - bake mold making equip-
ment that is exactly what is required to cast pistons, heads, 
blocks, and cam shafts for internal combustion engines and 
compressors. This equipment at E.A. Foundries is 
unscratched and has been idle for two years'. The 
Railways ' Blacksmith shop has the proper equipment 
20. When these possibilities were mentioned to the expatriate 
manager of a largo assembler of (completely knocked down) refrige-
rators and stoves he argued that the local enameling was not up to 
international standards and "we must maintain international 
standards". He assembles under license agreements with inter-
national firms but these stoves and refregerators are sold only 
on the domestic markets. The need for both the "standards' and 
the licensing agreements are dubious. 
- 2 1 - IDS/WP 393 
co forge connecting rods and crankshafts. The 
patterr dies for the castings and forgings would 
have ro be imported. Several rr.aehinc shops have 
the boring nrachinee and surface grinders to 
rr.achinv the rough castings and forgings though 
betccr heat treatment equipn.ent might be needed. 
A separate corporation should be establshed 
to subcontract out the local manufacture of parts, 
arrange for necessary imports, assemble the motors 
and compressors and arrange for thoi r distribution 
and sale. 'lose supervision by competent engineers 
would be necessary to maintain quality during the 
manufacture and assembly. 
Fee commendations 
(1) To Industrialize, Kenya must limit the 
number cf models of transport vehicles 1 There Is 
no escape from that conclusion. Already, 35% of 
Kenya's.imported sparer are for motor vehicles and 
tractors. And without fewer models increased local 
production of these spares and components is 
unlikely. So, the sooner this issue is confronted 
j the betner for the nation. 
To tackle this task the government should 
decide to allow only one model in each size class 
of commercial vehicle and tractor and at most two 
models (but on' make) of sedan car. ' Then 
21. Kenya imports tractors from at least 15 countries 
"with the result that hardly 40-50% are operational." 
S. S. Gill, Development: of Agricultural Machinery in Kenya, 
Industrial Survey and Promotion Centre, Kenya Ministry of 
Industry, 29 July 1980, p. 7. 
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competitors would bid to make each vehicle . The bids 
would be compared for price, suitability of the 
vehicle, commitment to increasing domestic content 
over time, speed of Kenyanization, etc. Once a bid 
were accepted the government would have to enforce 
severe penalties for non-obedience as the vehicle 
distributors and assemblers have strong financial 
incentives to procrastinate and thwart the local 
22 manufacture of parts. 
(2) For domestically producible items such as the 
foregoing examples, the government should apply 
three measures: 
(i) designate one or at most two producers/assemblers 
(ii) drastically limit the number of available models; 
and (iii) restrict imports. 
The designated producers (s )/assembler(s) should 
be instructed to subcontract the production of 
i components whenever possible in order to use 
the existing capacity better. The Kenyan price 
controller and Bureau of Standards should also be 
provided the staff and legal authority to intervene 
quickly and effectively in disputes between a 
producer/assembler and any subcontractor. This 
is especially necessary when a subcontractor is 
the only firm possessing the ability to make a 
certain component. 
22. Locally made products often cost more than the dele-
tion allowance (refund) given by the supplier for an item 
not imported in the completely knocked down (CKD) kit. But 
these allowances are usually less than the production costs in 
the mother country. Hence it is very difficult for the local 
vehicle component to ever be cheaper than the imported one. 
For instance, the production manager for a large Kenyan 
vehicle assembly plant figured that the deletion allowance 
for wire harnesses is about 70% of the production cost in 
the mother country. 
IDS/WP 398 
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Combined, the above three measures would greatly lower market 
penetration costs, en?.ble economies of scale, and overcome consumers' 
aversion to domestically made product?. Without this, a potential domestic 
producer, whc could efficiently produce an item if he captured most of its 
Kenyan market, would often refrain from investing. This leaves Kenya in a 
lew level production trap: costs would be high because of little production 
there would be little production because costs w>uld be high. For instance, 
as we have shown, Kony- coule cheaply produce single stage centrifugal water 
pumps, but she does net. Why nc^ t? All the large workshops possessing an 
adequate foundry and machine shop to produce pumps were asked this question. 
They cited as reasons the low number of pumps that they could soil given 
continued imports (100 was an often cited number), the consequently high 
production costs; and the large market penetration costs for sales, adver-
tising, gaining consumer confidence, and establishing a pump repair service. 
They also anticipated an inability to gain governmental protection and 
cooperation. So, each concluded that it was not worth the time and effort. 
But it is not a mere 100 puinps, it is at least 4000 yearly and most costs 
to penetrate the market and gain consumer acceptance could be eliminated 
through governmental protection against similar imports. These large shops 
often cited other products that they could make (e.g. internal combustion 
engines, cabins and jibs for cranes, automobile and transport vehicle 
components) or actually were making in small quantities (e.g. pumps, ox 
driven sugar crushers, and even 50-70 foot long steel fishing trawlers). 
Again their frustration was the lack of governmental support and protection. 
Whence comes this recommendation. 
But that is not to ignore its difficulties. A private 
monopoly may well attempt to afflict consumers with high prices 
and shoddy products. Hence the need to honestly regulate 
prices and quality or to allow a parastatal to produce 
the item and then confront the problems of efficiency. 
But, we argue, to produce these items and to tackle the con-
sequent problems is better than nut producing for fear of them. 
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Incidentally, if Kenya did begin to produce purr.ps, 
electrical motors and small internal combustion engines, 
she would have the ability to launch a massive campaign 
for irrigation at a low cost in foreign exchange. Of 
course, that irrigation could begin faster and at less 
cost where people already live and the infrastructure 
exis ts. 
(3) The government should also commission a study by 
engineers and economists to identify electrical and mechanical 
products which if the number of models were limited, could 
be produced partially or wholly in Kenya. The study should 
not cover transport vehicles as that case is obvious. 
3.2.2. Kenyan Acceptance of British Patent Law 
a) Si tuation 
According to Kenyan law only patents registered 
in England are accepted here and, in fact, Kenya does not 
have Lts own patenting procedure. This subservience to 
England's patent law makes Kenya pay royalties or licensing 
fees to produce patented items even when the designs are 
simple and sufficient technical capacity exists to produce 
these items here without dependence upon foreign "know how". 
Indeed Kenya benefits little and pays much (Tor its 
adherence to this patent system. In a study of multinational 
corporations in Kenya, Kaplinsky found that: 
"For all the firms in the sample the parents 
obtain the property rights over new technologies 
generated by the Kenyan subsidiaries and take 
responsibility for,the registration of patents 
an d brand names"."J 
b ) !'. e commend a i ons 
(1) Kenya should rr.odify its law to exclude patent 
rights for products of and processes in industries which Keny 
would 1 l k to develop (e.g. motors, agricultural equipment,eler 
23. Rapharel Kaplinrky, "Technical change and the mul!.'-
nation corporation: feme British Multinations in Kenya," in 
Readings or: rinl tinational Corpc rations. in Kenya, (Oxford 
University Press, 1978). P. 239. 
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goods)/ This would be a nationalist - not a radical measure-. For 
instance, when Italy wanted to develop its chemical industry it exempted 
chemicals from patent protection and later, after the industry was large, 
reimposed patent coverage. 
Also the production of spare p;:rts for use by Kenyan industries 
should be completely exempted from patent protection. This is 
necessary because some firms feel morally obliged to purchase imported 
patented spares even though these could be produced in their own workshops. 
For instance, the machine shop foreman of one large manufacturer figured 
that his shop could produce one-third more spares tnan currently if- patent 
restrictions did not apply, rle claimed that his company conscientiously 
avoided violating patent rights. Admittedly this case was atypical:, most 
manufacturers ignore patent rights when making spares for their machinery. 
(2) Kenya law should also oblige tne patent holder to locally produce 
satisfactory quantities of patented items or to lose his patent protection 
after three years. 
24. The Andean group excludes drugs, beverages and foods; India 
excludes drugs, other chemicals and foods , Mexico excludes alloys, chemcials, 
fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, fungicides and their manufacturing 
processes, and computer programs. See UNCTAD, "Annual Report 1981 on 
Legislative and other developments in developed and developing countries 
in the control of restrictive business practices: Review of recent trends 
in patents in developing countries". 24/Nov/81, TD/B/C. 6/AC . 5/3 . 
25. For instance, Atlas Copco sells a brass cylinder and piston pump 
with a patented ball bearing valve. The very sturdy upper wooden drive is 
entirely made in Kenya. The cylinder and piston pump is imported and accounts 
for 60% of the total value. But the pump is simple and could without doubt 
be made here. With a domestic production requirement to sustain patent 
rights someone could make these here if Atlas Copco refused. 
3.2.3 Overreliance on Licensing Agreements 
a) Situation 
Some items (e.g. fire extinguishers, pumps, stoves, 
safes) are assembled or partially manufactured here under 
license with foreign firms even though adequate local capacity 
exists to make nearly all their components and then to 
assemble them. Often capable, potential producers of an item 
are forced into a licensing agreement just to obtain a foreign 
label needed to penetrate the local market due to purchasers' 
biases favoring foreign labels. 
The excessive use of licensing agreements leads to 
(i) remittals abroad of licensing fees, (ii) more than 
necessary imported components, and, (iii) illegal transfer 
pricing of purchased components which are required to be 
obtained from the licensor. Consider three examples: 
(1) A loc^l ir.ar.ufac :urer showed th^ author many large 
safes (40"x27"x27" outside dimensions) made under 
an international licensing agreement. Only 
the door and its built-in lock were imported. 
The manager states that, of course, they could 
make the door too, but the licensor insists 
on supplying it in exchange for allowing use 
of its brand name. The manager argued that 
the brand name was necessary to gain acceptance 
of the product in the local market. Besides 
steel sheets only the lock really needs to 
be imported and it could be purchased from 
many suppliers in Germany, Switzerland, 
Japan, etc. 
(2) A domestic assembler/manufacturer of fire 
extinguishers said that most of the imported 
components in it could be produced here though 
nearly all were imported from the licensor. 
Furthermore, o^ly about one-third of these 
simple devices are even 3r sombled here; the 
rest are imported already made. He also 
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stated he pays nor? for these imported 
components than localIv produced ones 
would cost -- "since we don't pay a 
licensing fee "--i.e.. in lieu or the 
licensing fee. Incidentally the licensor 
thus avoids paying Kenyan taxes on 
licensing foes. * 
(3) ^he local manager of an Indian multinational 
corporation recertly licensed to assemble 
• completely - knocked - down (•'"KD) imported 
pumps stated that his firm "hoped" to 
eventually use ?0't domestically made 
components. /hereas, for about half the 
pumps that Kenya uses, the only directly 
importc 1 components should be the bearings 
26 costing a fraction of the pumps' value."' 
Re commendations . 
(1) Thc government should vigorously review the terms of 
many licensing agreements and their usefulness. Payments 
for label r - r-yceot perhaps if the item is beinr; 
exported - c-hould stop. Also contracts should provide 
ror (i) the complete transfer of designs for use at 
least in the Kenyar market; and, (ii) the elimination 
of the licensing fee after a stipulated number of 
years with a legal maximum of five years. 
Begumisa, op.cit., pp. 63, 64 and 101. 
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(2) Kenya should not allow imports that can be made locally. 
If so, then local labels would suffice for the domestic 
market. However, the price controller and the Bureau of 
Standards must prevent exorbitant prices and poor quality. 
Take the above case of fire extinguishers, Kenya should not 
allow this abuse1. The solution is simple: designate one or 
two domestic producers; stop the imports; use as many 
domestically produced components as possible; use a local 
label and pay no licensing fee or inflated prices for inputs. 
3.3. Political/Economic-and Bureaucratic Obstacles To A 
Boom In Domestic Production 
6. Strong opposition and some support would arise if 
measures to limit the number of makes and models, restrict 
imports; and domestically produce various items and components 
are seriously supported by elements inside the government. 
A strong pressure group would oppose the adoption of the 
policies, or attempt delays and detrimental compromises. 
Finally, an often corrupt and sometimes incompetent bureaucracy 
might undermine the policies' implementation by still 
allowing imports or by failing to properly enforce price and 
quality controls. 
In the past, the Kenyan strategy for agricultural 
exports together with shallow import substitution created 
a political dilemma. That very strategy slowed the growth 
of a strata of entrepreneurs with strong financial interests 
in the country's deeper industrialization. Meanwhile numerous 
people arose whose incomes and lifestyles depended upon 
continued imports of finished goods and components for 
assembly (e.g.. transport vehicles, electrical apparatus, 
pumps, various machinery, stoves). For instance, there are 
2 7 distributors of imported pumps and Associated Vehicle 
Assemblers assembles vehicles for 21 distributors, Leyland for 
4, and General Motors for 20. These importer/distributors and 
local assemblers of foreign products do not want to be • 
displaced or have their profits squeezed by protection to 
domestic producers of similar products, components or spares. 
Also the local subsidiaries of multinational corporations 
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prefer not to invest to make items here if the mother company 
2 7 
has sufficient capacity elsewhere. Thus the very way Kenya 
approached import substitution ensured the growth of a strong 
group which would oppose or stall deeper import substitution. 
These importers/distributors and subsidiaries of multi-
national companies also cultivate economic and political allian-
ces with influential Kenyans. These then sit on the Boards of 
Directors, become shareholders or develop other lucrative 
2 8 
relations with these companies. Thus some policy makers are 
seriously compromised with groups having financial interests 
contrary to the fast industrialization of Kenya. Tor instance, 
many vehicle distributors are associated with powerful politi-
cians. It is also widely alleged that small importer/distribu-
tors often subvert policy by bribing clerks and lower echelon 
officials in the ministries and Central Bank to permit unnecessary 
imports. In addition, external lending and aid agencies sometimes even ex-
plicitly oppose 
27. For instance, the Kenyan vehicle assembly industry has been slow 
to increase domestic content and, as one managing director admitted, "un-
dynamic" in searching for and stimulating the domestic manufacture of origi-
nal equipment components. Artificial standards are sometimes used as an 
excuse to refuse to produce domestically. The general manager of a local 
vehicle assembly plant, himself, made this point arid cited the case where 
locally made leaf springs were sent for "testing" by the mother company's 
supplier. Predictably, they failed the "test". See the forthcoming (1983), 
University of Nairobi, Lconomics Department, M.A. Research Paper by Z.N. 
Murage on the Kenyan Vehicle Assembly Industry. 
28. Nicola Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 
1918-77, (University of California Press, 1980), Ch.5 and 6. Also see Raphie 
Kaplinsky, "Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery : Kenya", in Martin 
Fransman (ed), Industry and Accumulation in Africa, (Heineman, 1982). See 
especially the lists of major Kenyan African capitalists and their ownings 
and directorships on pp. 204-6. 
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deeper import substitution by Kenya. This coalition of 
interests and politicians, abetted by corruptible bureaucrats 
jeopardizes Kenya's ability to embark on the strong nationalist 
policy needed for rapid industrialization to he able to maintain 
30,000,000 Kenyans by the turn of the century. 
Potentially arrayed against this coalition are various 
nationalist elements inside the government, the commercial 
metal engineering workshops and foundries, certain labor 
unions, and some enlightened industrialists who identify with 
the country'-: lon-j term economic prospects. But this is a 
dispersed and only potential alliance. Furthermore, most 
entrepreneurs owning commercial foundries and metal engineering 
workshops are small. And -- as revealed by the surveys --
though the few larger ones may have sufficient connections to 
overcome difficulties with an occasional import license, they 
do not feel that alone they have enough political clout to-
win in a clash against irroorters. 
But Kenya suffers a foreign exchange crisis. The 
continued imports of luxurious consumer .>ocds (e.g. wines and 
liquors, passenger cars, rancy clothing, television sets) and 
the unratloned use of gasoline by the upper and middle income 
strata have already caused factories to lack inputs and lay 
off men. Luxuries for layoffs — a volatile exchange? Thus 
the imperatives at this ji:n.;tur< bolster those insisting on 
rapidlv deepening Kenya's industrial base. So, with no more 
avenues for shallow import-substitution and meagre prospects 
for Increased exports, many in the government ane looking for 
a. new strategy to create jobs and ward off an econom.ic 
breakdown and political instability. 
29. The World Dank argued" .. it if most iesirable for 
Kenya to avoid -oing through the second stage of import 
substitution (protection of intermediate goods) with the 
additional taxation of toe rest o* the econom.y that this brings 
in train", (p. 40).. Kenya Into the Second Decade, World Bank 
Country Econom.ic Report (John Hopkins University Press, 1975. 
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To provide jobs in Kenya, a significant policy would be 
to limit the number of makes ana models -- especially of trans-
port v e h i d e s -- and to insist or. the domestic manufacture of 
components and entire products whenever large amounts of foreign 
exchange would be saved. But a sharp political conflict would 
ensue especially if the government adopted the suggested proposal 
for bidding to make a limited number of models of vehicles and 
then stopped almost all imports including Mercedes cars. Con-
fronted with a serious stance by the government, the assemblers 
and distributors would definitely attempt to persuade the govern-
ment to increase the number of acceptable models to, say, two or 
three for each size category of trucks and buses and to four to 
six sedan cars. This would ensure each company some share of 
the market. But, it would deprive the country of big savings 
from economies of scale and ruin the chance to streamline the 
production and administration of this industry which is mostly 
government owned. To properly defend Kenya's interests the 
government would need to firmly resist this tactic of the 
assemblers and distributors.' 
•4. Conclus ions 
Many people with high income or secure well paying 
jobs or import businesses may be better off if Kenya continues 
to import a wide variety of goods, even those that could be made 
here. But it would be in the interests of most Kenyans to work 
and make useful products whether or not they do it as efficiently 
as the developed industrial countries. Too often the arguments 
for obeying "comparative advantages" are but apologies for con-
tinued dependence and failure to industrialize. If Kenya has 
sufficient underutilized equipment and skilled and unskilled 
labor to make certain products and by doing so can save much 
foreign exchange, it should do it and put Kenyans to work.' 
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Indeed the equipment and skills do exist in Kenya to 
make very many items that are imported currently. A boom 
in the foundries and engineering industries could be created 
by: rationalizing the number of models of various products, 
eliminating imports of domestically producible items, 
lowering the inflated prices that wholesalers charge for 
speciality steels, reducing the scope and cost of licensing 
agreements, restricting patent protection, and discriminatorily 
favoring the allocation of foreign exchange to basic and 
engineering industries. 
This would create thousands of jobs through backward and 
forward linkages (e.g.. for plastics components; assembly of 
the products; and in agriculture) and would decrease import 
dependence. The technical capacity exists to do this. Does 
the political capacity exist? Can the resistances be over" 
come? Is a vigorous nationalist, policy for in/te^catied 
economic development possible? A serious test of this is 
whether the Kenyan government can rationalize the transport 
vehicle industry. 
frki ctner ^ pendices are Available 
upon request from IDS. 
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Suggestions Needing Additional Evaluation 
1. Machine Tools Industry 
The government is currently evaluating establishing a 
machine tools factory, yet, most of the equipment required to 
make parts for the machine tools is already in the Railways' 
workshops and is grossly underutilized. There is also conside-
rable extra space inside the building housing the tool and machine 
shops. Indeed the workshops' management agreed that with 
proper production planning, better supervision, and more employees 
for a partial second shift, the Railways' workshops could become 
the basis for the machine tools industry in Kenya. The imported 
and locally made components could be assembled in a separate 
building, perhaps located on the railways' premises so as to 
minimize transport costs. 
For the Railways' workshop to render the precision 
required some artisans would need special training and a few 
machines purchased. Supervisors would need ample authority to 
reward or discipline artisans for good or sho.ddy work. Quality 
control would have to be strict The organizational questions 
would have to be confronted boldly and firmly. 
By utilizing the huge Railways workshop as the basis for 
the machine tools industry in Kenya, the country would save 
much foreign exchange and domestic expenditure by not purchasing 
redundant machinery to make parts and not building redundant 
factory space to house yet another metal engineering workshop. 
In fact, the government has been considering establishing a 
domestic machine tools industry during at least the last five 
years. But the project's low profitability has hindered efforts 
to raise finances for it. If it were possible to partially use 
existing capacities then the domestic financial coststforeign 
exchange requirements, and the per- unit overhead costs would be 
lowered, and profitability increased. If labour productivity 
and quality could be sustained under this set-up, then it might 
improve the project and speed its implementation. This option 
should be evaluated further out quickly. 
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2. On-the-job training of machinists 
The small workshops are more dependent upon expatriate 
artisans than larger workshops. The small entrepreneurs often 
express reluctance to train Kenyans to become technicians. 
They fear loosing their investment in that training if the employee 
suddenly leaves. Some even scheme to provide so limited training 
that the employee will not be able to market his skills else-
where. With this fear of "poaching'' and occasionally a very 
negative attitude toward African workers, a small workshop owner 
may prefer to obtain or retain an expatriate or if he does 
train a Kenyan it may be in a haphazard manner. As one owner 
said, "if we train they .are 'poached' ... If this could be 
avoided then we would need very few expatriates but because of 
this 'poaching' we have no apprentices." 
This is a problem of attitudes and incentives. Usually 
these small entrepreneurs have the skills and capability to 
train artisans on-the-job but often they do not train. The 
government should commission a small quick study to identify 
bettor how to stimulate these small machine shops to train 
machinists. 
3. Technical training 
When in Mombasa I visited the Mombasa Technical Training 
Institute, and the Mombasa Polytechnic. Until just before the 
time I arrived the Polytechnic had been operating from 7.00 a.m. 
- 1.00 p .m. This suggested to me the possibility of running 
such technical training facilities on two-shifts. 
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Both the Chairman of the Mechanical and Civil Engineering 
Departments agreed that by hiring additional staff and building 
small offices for them, the number of students could double with-
out needing more classrooms or equipment. The Technical In-
stitute could also expand - though not double - its student body. 
The Chairmen claimed that the extra graduates could easily 
find employment. The extra students would need to be housed 
with relatives or to rent accommodation in the city. This would 
be a change from current policy for the Polytechnic. By starting 
second shifts and using local housing, technical education in 
Kenya could be rapidly expanded at very low capital costs. If 
vigorously pursued, a second shift could possibly begin within 
12 months after the policy and financial decisions were made 
by the government. This contrasts with the long delays and 
large expense of expanding entire educational complexes or 
building new ones. This cheaper, faster option merits serious 
cons i de rati on. 
